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In … an asexual group, systematic classification would not be impossible, for groups of related forms would exist which had arisen by divergence from a common ancestor. Species, properly speaking, we could hardly expect to find, for each individual genotype would have an equal right to be regarded as specifically distinct, and no natural groups would exist bound together like species by a constant interchange of their germ-plasm.
The groups most nearly corresponding to species would be those adapted to fill so similar a place in nature that any one individual could replace another. (Fisher 1958:135)
Abstract
Species concepts for bacteria and other microbes are contentious, because they are often asexual. There is a Problem of Homogeneity: every mutation in an asexual lineage forms a new strain, of which all descendents are clones until a new mutation occurs. We should expect that asexual organisms would form a smear or continuum. What causes the internal homogeneity of asexual lineages, if they are in fact homogeneous? Is there a natural “species concept” for “microbes”? Two main concepts devised for metazoans and metaphytes have been applied to bacteria. One is the Recombination Concept, a revised form of the Biological Species Concept in which the homogenizing mechanism is the sharing of genome fragments, somewhat akin to sexual recombination. The other is the Ecological Species Concept, in which the ecological niche is that which maintains lineages as cohesive. In this paper I will discuss these two concepts, and offer an underlying model that conjoins them, and consider the implications for species concepts in general. In short, my argument is that asexual species are instances of the most primitive and underived notion of species, which I will call “quasispecies”, following Eigen, and that sexual species are merely one derived kind of species. Moreover, I will argue that there is a continuum of recombination from simple viral models in which each strain is a clone, through to obligate recombination of 50% of the parents’ genome, and that consequently there is no sharp division between “microbial” and more familiar species.
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The Problem of Homogeneity
There is a longstanding debate over whether microbial species form species taxa. This is predominantly due to operational difficulties of identification, but also because microbial organisms usually lack sexual recombination that is considered by many to be crucial for the evolution of reproductive isolation, which is according to the dominant view of what species are, the defining character of being a species. What is a microbial species, either a bacterial or other mostly asexual single celled species? Let us begin by noting that this is a perpetual problem in microbiology. In 1962, microbiologist G. D. Floodgate noted the following points about the state of thinking about bacteria at the time. Arguably microbiologists are in much the same straits now as then.
Of all the words in the taxonomist’s vocabulary, probably the most difficult to define is “species.” The perplexities which bacteriologists encounter in trying to give the word an exact meaning are well known … . A species has been described as more real or as having “a greater degree of objectivity” than any other taxon …, but it has also been called a man-made fiction … . Again, according to one author … a species is a dynamic system, but according to another it is as outdated as phlogiston … . Further, a meaning given to “species” in one biological discipline may not be used at all in another. For example, the bacteriologist does not usually refer to interbreeding or exchange of genetical material when describing the meaning of species as other biologists sometimes do, though recently an attempt has been made to introduce species in this sense in bacteriology as well ….  Yet again, some bacteriologists have considered  a species to be a discrete segment of a phyletic line evolving independently of other segments … . (Floodgate 1962)
To address this issue, I want to pose a philosophical problem I shall call the Problem of Homogeneity, or, Why Are There Microbial Species and Not Just A Mess of Strains?
First, we should note that the literature on microbial species refers to a number of groupings of organisms: prokaryotes, protists, monerans, bacteria, and so on. There appears to be no single term to cover them all, so I will here adopt “microbe” as a convenient label, following O’Malley and Dupré (2007), although it must not be thought that this implies microbes are a natural group. Few of these groups appear to be “natural” (in the cladistic sense of monophyletic). Almost all of them are defined as some complement of Life after other groups, eukaryotes, animals or metazoans, plants or metaphytes, and fungi, have been taken out. In other words, “microbe” is a paraphyletic or polyphyletic grouping. Discussions of microbial species have often focussed on the operational aspects of diagnosis. However, what we want is not an operational convention to delimit microbial species, but a theoretical, or ontological, account of what kinds of things microbial species could be. Several options have been proposed:
	Microbial species could be formed from an analogue of sexual recombination, via lateral transfer between strains, or by other mechanisms of genetic exchange that cause a “core genome” to be maintained which prevents some lateral transfer from being successful, much in the same way that reproductive isolation acts to prevent gene exchange.
	Microbial species could be simple ecotypes, tracking the fitness peaks of hosts, in the case of parasites, pathogens and single host exploiters.
	Microbial species could be a disparate and ultimately illusory conventional category with no underlying ontological category that applies to each and every case. If this is true, then we should expect to find no principled cause for microbial species, and each case would have a different account. I will seek to show this is not the case.
We need to account for the cohesion and clustering of genotypes and phenotypes of microbes. This gives us a “species phenomenon” (Brigandt 2003) to investigate, and is the explanandum of microbial species. Operational criteria are useful only so far as they are reliable markers of underlying biological realities. So we will ignore operational issues here.
The problem facing microbiologists is that usually in “macrobial” biology a species is defined as a group of related organisms that share genes (or is a gene pool, which amounts to the same thing), the so-called Biological Species Concept. Sometimes ecological considerations are also included (either in the form of shared natural selection, or in terms of sharing an adaptive niche). But many bacterial and archaeal species either do not exchange genes to reproduce, or they can but do not need to; that is, they are either facultative gene exchangers or obligate non-exchangers. So the question is sometimes raised whether these organisms form species at all, or if there is some replacement taxon term or concept for groups of them. And while many recent writers, such as Templeton (1998) or Coyne and Orr (2004) now, rather grudgingly, accept the reality of asexual species, others such as Meier and Willmann (2000), continue to deny species rank to asexual taxa, instead calling them “agamotaxa”.​[1]​ Even so, bacteriologists continued during the Synthesis and after to name and describe species, even though they could not really make use of the Biological Species Concept of Dobzhansky and Mayr. They relied, among other characters, on their organism’s staining properties, the colony shape, the microscopic morphology of the cells, and of course the ecological conditions under which they lived. What was lacking, though, was a clear definition of what a species could be for these organisms (Moreno 1997; Cohan 2001, 2002; Istock et al. 1996; Tibayrenc 2006).
Part of the difficulty is that if a species were obligately clonal, then each mutation should make a new clonal lineage, a strain, and we might naively expect to find not genetic clusters but a carpet of strains more or less evenly distributed (figure 1). How can we account for this? I will call this the Problem of Homogeneity: why are asexual lineages ever found as groups at all? Why are they homogeneous over time, and stable enough to be called “species” (Hanage, Fraser, and Spratt 2006)? 
There are two relevant conceptions of what species are for macrobial species, which is to say, species of plants and animals.​[2]​ One is the suite of definitions that rely upon reproductive isolation, such as the Biological Species Concept, the Recognition Concept (Paterson 1985), the Genotypic Cluster Concept (Mallet 1995), and Templeton’s Cohesion Concept (Templeton 1989). The last is interesting because it combines both genetic (reproductive cohesion) and ecological similarity. These might be grouped together as Reproductive Isolation Conceptions. The other set of conceptions relies directly on ecological roles (Hutchinson 1968; Ghiselin 1974; Van Valen 1976; Sterelny 1999). Although ecological species conceptions are rarely proposed as a sufficient account of sexual species, they are invoked to explain why sexual organisms that can freely interbreed between species remain constant as species. Another set of conceptions, which rely on evolutionary or phylogenetic differentiation, are not important in this context, as they merely restate what is our problem here, to wit, that clusters of lineages form over evolutionary time. We require an account of why they cluster before we can apply historical conceptions such as phylospecies or evospecies.
 
Figure 1: The “carpet model” of asexual strains. This is a two-dimensional representation of a high-dimensional genome space. See Gavrilets (2004) and Skipper (2004) for a discussion of the concept and representation of a genome spaces and fitness spaces. Although the distribution shown here is even, random strains are likely to form a Poisson distribution from the initial genome coordinate.
Lateral and Horizontal Transfer
A further complication of the topic is the increasing recognition that microbial organisms do share their genetic material often and in evolutionarily important ways.​[3]​ “Lateral” transfer usually refers to the transfer of individual genetic components across distant phylogenetic groups, while “horizontal” transfer often refers to the interbreeding of genomes between species, but the basic problem is the same: how can we define species (in microbes) if their genetic lineages do not generally match their expected phylogeny? Is there even any sense in calling these phylogenetic lineages?
To address these questions, I will appeal to the notion of a genomic space, which is effectively the adaptive landscape idea of Sewall Wright (see Pigliucci and Kaplan 2006 for a treatment of this; a more technical account is given in Gavrilets 2004). A genomic space is an n-dimensional space of all possible genomes, and each coordinate in that space represents one genome. Our explanandum is that instead of finding genomes more or less evenly smearing over the possible genome space, we find that microbial species, like viral species, cluster, which is to say, they form homogeneous groups.
Is the Problem of Homogeneity an Illusion?
We must first set up expectations here: could clustering be the result of simple stochasticity of mutation and extinction? Simulations give reasons for thinking that random processes will not generate the sort of clustering actually observed (described, e.g., in Konstantinidis, Ramette, and Tiedje 2006). Further, they indicate that logistic diversification and phylogenetic entrenchment will give this sort of distribution.
It might be thought that clustering in genome space doesn’t need explanation. Clustering of phylotypes might in the first case simply be due to stochastic processes of elimination and divergence. To reject that assumption, I will appeal here to a recent paper (Pie and Weitz 2005) on null models in morphospace. Given that the morphological traits here are heritable, and that they are in effect asexually transmitted (because the morphology here is typical of a species that diverges in a branching random walk), it is applicable to our case. This is an argument by simulation, and lacks as yet any empirical foundation, but as we have no clear prior assumptions about what the default expectations for asexually reproducing lineages may be, this may help to give us some. Further simulations might change these expectations. The authors understood their simulation to apply in the case of asexual lineages (Pie, pers. comm.).
Pie and Weitz simulated speciation in four cases. In the first case, they allowed speciation without extinction, which generated the expected carpet model. In the second case, they allowed stochastic extinction, and the surprising result here is that the clustering, while tighter, still spreads out evenly. In the third case, however, they allowed logistic diversification, equivalent to “adaptive niche packing” according to carrying capacity, and now we see the scatter of clusters that we do find in genotypic space in asexual lineages. A fourth case allowed developmental entrenchment, in which the longer the trait (in our case, gene sequence) has been in the lineage, the less likely it is to go extinct, and the clustering is even more diverse and tightly packed, although mean separation decreased in this case after an initial increase. Since speciation without extinction and with stochastic extinction are both stochastic processes, while the other two cases answer to selection for niche occupancy and internal cohesion respectively, it appears that simple stochasticity does not explain clustering, and we must consider the other two cases separately. Other realistic factors are not included here, such as differential extinction due to habitat fracturing, which may still form clusters in a stochastic manner. Extinction can cause there to be patches in genome space. Some varieties die out. While this can be because of selection, often it will be due to plain old genetic drift, and contingency. Moreover, if a genome evolves in a habitat that is sensitive to sudden changes in climate or even geological change that degrades it, then that genome and its neighbors will become extinct. 
Even so, Pie and Weitz’s model gives us an initial expectation that when patchiness occurs over large numbers of genome lineages, it will be due either to selection or to the phylogenetic integration of certain genes in the developmental process (their “developmental entrenchment”).
Sex versus Ecology as a Solution to Homogeneity
Sex
One solution to the Problem of Homogeneity for asexual organisms is what I will call the Recombination Species Concept. Proposed by Dykhuizen and Green (1991), it basically the Biological Species Concept for lineages that occasionally share genes or gene fragments through lateral transfer:
“the phylogenies of different genes from individuals of the same species should be significantly different, whereas the phylogeny of genes from individuals of different species should not be significantly different. Thus we have an operational criterion for the defining of bacterial species” (Dykhuizen and Green 1991:7266)
“Horizontal gene transfer across species should be rare enough that it will not be a problem.” (loc. cit p7267)
There are several mechanisms by which lateral transfer of DNA can occur among “prokaryotes”. One is DNA fragment reuptake, in which DNA from a cell that has lysed (its membrane or wall has disintegrated, releasing the cell contents into the medium) is taken up by another cell, and rather than being digested it becomes active. There are variations on this. Entire small chromosomal rings, called plasmids, can be taken up this way. Or a cell can “bleb”, forming vesicles, or compartments, of lipids, containing DNA (including plasmids), which then attach to the receiving cell, opening up to the interior. A process that is directly analogous to sex in bacteria is conjugation. This is a case where part of the genetic component, usually plasmids, which are secondary small chromosomes, or the main nucleoid, can be inserted into another cell via processes called pili, which are part of the Type IV secretory system used for other purposes and which is homologous to flagella in Gram-negative bacteria. The typical mode of conjugation is that one mating type (often called the “male”) is activated by pheromones from another mating type (“female”) to attach the pilus to the recipient, and insert the genetic material. This is “almost-sex”, because there is no genetic reassortment, but other processes will tend to shuffle genes into the nucleoid, as well as utilizing the taken-up plasmids. But again, while the mating types seem to act as cohesive mechanisms, conjugation can be profligate across large, even vast, phylogenetic distances (and hence genetic distances). It has been observed between bacteria and yeast, bacteria and plants, and there has even been a case in which it was observed between bacteria (E. coli) and mammalian (hamster) cells (Waters 2001), although there is no evidence this caused any evolutionary outcome. Some microbes can have multiple mating types at different parts of the developmental cycle. Plasmodium falciparum, the pathogen that causes malaria in humans, for instance, has seven, and many of the Plasmodia have more.
The Recombination model of microbial species is based on the claim that the greater the genetic distance between strains, the less likely it is that the transferred genes will be functional and useful in the receiving strain, and this is what serves to maintain the homogeneity of bacterial and other microbial species (the phylogenetic entrenchment of Pie and Weitz). One of the claims of Dykhuizen and Green is in fact that the differences in genetic structure, and in some cases differences in restriction enzymes, that break DNA sequences, will make the DNA fragment non-coding, or insert it in a nonfunctional location in the target genome. This is sometimes referred to as the Core Genome Hypothesis or Genomic Island Hypothesis (Wertz et al. 2003; Coleman et al. 2006) – what makes laterally transferred genes functional are the core “housekeeping genes” that do not get transferred because they are critical to the functioning and viability of the organism, and are closely entrenched in that organism’s genome. This means that they will likely not be useful in distantly related organisms with their own entrenchments.
These compatibility issues act in the same way that sex does in sexual species to maintain the overall “location” in genome space of the population (figure 2). Those strains that deviate too far from the mode will be unable to take up the functionally useful lateral genes, and so will be more susceptible to extinction through genetic load. Hence, on the Recombination Model, compatibility of gene exchange will generate patchiness in gene space.

Figure 2: In the Recombination Model, functional lateral or horizontal transfer (thick horizontal lines) maintains the cohesion of the cluster of genomes.
So the Recombination Model is a mix of Maynard Smith’s theory of sex, and Mayr’s notion of biological species. The problem is that it isn’t consistently true. Recombination via lateral transfer is rather more profligate than it first seemed (Beiko, Harlow, and Ragan 2005), while there are some “species” of bacteria, such as the Lyme Disease-causing spirochete Borrelia burgdorferi, that do not share autapomorphic genes much, if at all (as Dykhuizen himself observes: Dykhuizen and Baranton 2001). So if in those latter cases clustering occurs, it is not due to lateral transfer, but some other processes. While it may be that recombination of lineages through partial lateral genetic transfer operates as a reason for some phylotypes occurring, it does not account for all, and LGT is therefore not a sine qua non of specieshood, or homogeneity, among all microbes. 
Ecology
An alternative explanation for the coherence of the genome cluster of asexuals is that they are, in Templeton’s words (1989), “demographically replaceable”. That is, they tend to occupy the same fundamental ecological niche. Cohan, for instance (Cohan 2002) has proposed a “stable ecotype” conception of bacterial species. This would be a sufficient explanation, were it not for the fact that “species within species” in bacteria and other organisms, that is, clusters that fall within other clusters of genomes, can occupy quite divergent niches or have different phenotypes; e.g., Burkholderia mallei, which causes glanders, and B. pseudomallei, which causes melioidosis (Hanage et al. 2006), though the former is a genomic strain of the latter. Ecological adaptation alone fails to account for the clustering, although geographical isolation and local adaptation could. For instance, a pathogen that switches host species or cell types may fall within the overall cluster so long as the ecologically relevant genes do not have to vary too far from the region which the ancestral species occupies in genome space. Hence, there is no unique genome cluster for some differing ecotypes.
In the case of a hypothetical purely asexual species, which lacks any lateral or horizontal transfer, ecological adaptation may suffice to explain the coherence of the cluster. And if the species are sympatric (that is, they share the same host or ecological environment), divergent selection could be expected to shift the location of the strain’s genome, and thus break the homogeneity of the cluster (Cohan 2001). In the case of an organism that is competent to occupy many such niches, however, coherence cannot be explained simply in terms of ecological adaptation.
So, there are two main mechanisms that might be applied to microbial species, neither of which quite fits the all the facts. The problem lies, I believe, in the attempt to make only one of them a universal conception of species. To address this, we must reconsider what it is we are trying to explain; what the phenomena are.
Quasispecies and species conceptions
The “species phenomenon” (Brigandt 2003) here is the clustering of genomes in a state space akin to the adaptive landscape model of genetics. A genomic cluster of this kind in purely asexual cases is called a “quasispecies”(devised to deal with virus species, Eigen 1993), which is a definite cloud of genomes that cluster about a “wild type”. A phenotypic version would be the phenetic “operational taxonomic unit”, but we will discuss only genotypic quasispecies. According to the concept as developed by Manfred Eigen​[4]​ for viral species, a quasispecies (“as-if-species”) is a cluster of genomes in a genome space of the dimensionality of the number of loci. He defined them as a
… region in sequence space [which] can be visualized as a cloud with a center of gravity at the sequence from which all mutationsxe "mutation" arose. It is a self-sustaining populationxe "population" of sequences that reproduce themselves imperfectly but well enough to retain a collective identity over time. (Eigen 1993:35)
A quasipecies is in effect a cluster of genomes (figure 3), with a “wild-type” coordinate (that is, genome) that may or may not actually have an extant or extinct instance. The cluster is measured by the modulus of the Cartesian, or Hamming, distance from the wild-type.

Figure 3: A quasispecies is a cluster of genomes in a space determined by the number of loci in the genomes, and the alleles at those loci, about a “wild-type” mode.
A genetic cluster of the quasispecies kind is therefore not unlike James Mallet’s Genotypic Cluster Concept (Mallet 1995), although his is also primarily an operational definition than a substantive underlying account of species, relying on diagnosis. However, we still need to account for microbial quasispecies existing in the first place. We have considered one possible mechanism – gene sharing by lateral transfer – and found it to be insufficient. Is there something else we might make use of? There is one proposal by Alan Templeton (Templeton 1989), devised for sexual organisms, which defines a species as a genetic cluster, as Mallet’s does, but accounts for it both by genetic exchange, as in the recombination model, and ecological (“demographic”) interchangeability.
For any cluster of genomes, each coordinate in genome space, that is to say each genome, has a fitness value associated with it that is imposed by ecological factors. If the adaptive landscape is relatively smooth, which means that adjacent coordinates are correlated in their fitness values, we should expect in the absence of all other causes of clustering that the cloud of genomes will tend to centre upon the most adaptive genome (figure 4). Of course, this is an abstraction and a gross simplification – genomes are not independent of each other, or from fitness values. Organisms create their ecological conditions to a degree, and how fit a genome is depends also upon what other genomes exist in a population (at least, in sexual organisms), but we can leave these complications to one side for the moment.

Figure 4: Clustering could be explained in terms of tracking fitness peaks – deviations from the local adaptive peak would be eliminated by selection.
So one potential reason why quasispecies exist, why genomes cluster, is that they track local fitness peaks. Take a pathogen that is clonal. It needs to employ certain features of the host species in order to infect and exploit that host. Assuming these features remain constant – say they are recognition molecules on a cell surface – the quasispecies will cluster about those points in the genome space that are more effective than others with respect to the capacity to infect and exploit.
Now we have the two cohesion mechanisms proposed by Templeton – cohesion due to shared genes, and cohesion due to the need to exploit the environment better than competitors. Anything that can do well at the latter will tend to be better represented in the average population. Hence quasispecies. But fitness peaks typically do not remain constant or decoupled from the populational structure. Does this mean that quasispecies are not real species because they are ephemeral? Of course not, as all species are, over a suitably extended timescale, ephemeral. That is in the nature of evolution. What the fitness peak conception means is that a quasispecies will remain homogeneous so long as there is a more or less unitary fitness peak. If the peaks shift, there will be “speciation” or, stopping the pretense that quasispecies aren’t real species, there will be real speciation.
Prototype Species Concepts
We have problems when we attempt to apply to organisms that are not obligately sexual (that is, which don’t have to have sex to reproduce) concepts that were specified to use with those that are obligately sexual. The Recombination Model is one such attempt. It is true that some microbial species exchange genes. Others do it more frequently and more completely. However, there appears to be a continuum of gene exchange all the way from almost never to almost every generation. So why should we expect that gene transfer will provide us with the sort of homogeneity of lineages and quasispecies that it does in obligate sexual species?
In part this is because we always start from what we know. The existence and ubiquity of asexual organisms has been resisted by macrobial biologists for a long time, and treated as exceptional rather than the rule, because biology began with large scale plants and animals where the paradigm cases were encountered for the biospecies concept. As exceptional cases were encountered, these concepts were stretched, and modified, to serve the increasingly “deviant” cases, until now we realize that deviance is relative to the exemplary conceptions rather than a fact about the organisms. Instead, we should take seriously the idea that genetic exchange forms a continuum, as the basis from which the metazoan and metaphyte conceptions are drawn out. It is worth considering how the two factors of the Templeton conception – exchange and ecological niche – play differing roles according to the degree of sex a lineage has.

Figure 5: The contribution of the homogeneity of a microbial species of reproductive cohesion increases with the percentage of gene exchange between lineages, while the proportion of the contribution of niche tracking will decline.
So, in respect of the notion that sex is not an all-or-nothing affair, if the continuum ranges from 0% gene exchange (total asexuality) to 50% gene exchange (total sexuality), then it follows that at the asexual end, exchange can have only limited to no effect on maintaining homogeneity, while at the sexual end, it can have a very great role in maintaining homogeneity (figure 5). Likewise, at the asexual end, homogeneity not due to stochastic effects or geographical fracturing will be due largely to ecological selection (fitness peak tracking), while for sexuals this will not be so important a cause. For sexual organisms at the upper end, reproductive cohesion permits the taxon to track many ecological fitness peaks when the reproductive cohesion is sufficient to overcome the divergent selection of multiple fitness peaks (figure 6). However, in cases where so-called sympatric speciation is possible, set out by Gavrilets, this will not prevent speciation.

Figure 6: Pure asexual species are maintained by niche selection, while pure sexuals are maintained also by reproductive cohesion, allowing multiple fitness peaks to be tracked to a degree.
This plurality of cluster causation is why gene exchange doesn’t have a simple relationship to genomic homogeneity. It will depend on the rate and amount of genes shared across lineages case by case, as well as the degree to which the quasispecies is maintained by ecological interchangeability. Following on from a discussion about speciation (Wilkins 2007), and an earlier paper on species concepts (Wilkins 2003), where I employed the phylogeny of sex to argue that being a biospecies is an evolved trait, not a natural kind, we ought to expect that each species and group of species has its own unique evolutionary history and therefore properties, just as limbs and lungs and livers do. In effect, the modality of “being a species” is an evolved property. There will be a more general theoretical context of adaptive landscapes, gene dynamics, and so on, but given that each evolutionary group has encountered different conditions, this means that each modality will be shared in a fairly limited way.
Templeton’s “Genetic Cohesion” concept for sexual species involves both kinds of mechanisms – cohesion mechanisms of genetic and reproductive compatibility and isolation from other groups, and ecological or “demographic” exchangeability, in which organisms play the same general role ecologically. The view of Templeton is that species are conjunctively defined by being genetic clusters, any member of which is “demographically replaceable” and “genetically exchangeable”; i.e., they can exchange genes, and do the same thing ecologically. But this conjunction cannot be true for facultatively sexual and obligately asexual species, which leads us to a disjunct for those properties.
Microbial species therefore are maintained either by ecological selection or by successful genetic exchange, or both. This leads to a view of the role of ecological selection in the absence of genetic exchange as the sole cause of microbial species, but that in the case of increasing genetic exchange, the importance of local adaptation declines as a factor in the quasispecies identity.
To return to the operational issue once more, a reviewer asks whether this will assist us in identifying the ecological niches for microbial (and, mutatis mutandis, macrobial) species. In medical cases like the Burkholderia bacteria mentioned above, the ecological niche is the host cells, infection of which cause the disease. Hence the disease is a marker for a distinct ecological niche. We are not always so “fortunate” as to have these markers, or for them to be unambiguous. In mostly vertical genetic transfer quasispecies there will on this account be an ecological niche, and so we might expect that the trophic role they play when discovered is indeed that niche (although the entire lifecycle will need to be followed through). However, in mixed modalities, this is going to be increasingly harder the more genetic material is, on average, exchanged per generation, as it will mean that more adaptive peaks can be tracked. All I can say here is that if they are almost entirely asexual, they cluster because they have a single ecotype.
The reviewer also asks if species, being the phenomenological outputs of these two processes of selection and exchange, are also inputs into biological processes. Certainly, those who allow for species selection believe species are in fact causal actors. I do not. In each case, unless the species is coterminous with a single deme, the causal activity is at the population level at most. I do not think, although I cannot argue for it here, that species are either theoretical objects of biology in the sense of elements of a theory or required by an ensemble of theories, or that they are the explanans of any other explanandum in biology apart from the classificatory activities of taxonomists and philosophers of biology. Both microbial and macrobial species are phenomena of genomic clusters and ecological inhabitants.
Conclusion
The basic notion of a phenomenal species, in microbes or in microbes, is a genetic cluster in genome space, called a “quasispecies”. This is the explanandum for which ecological or reproductive explanations are given. The role of reproductive compatibility, leading to isolation from other groups, applies increasingly as the amount of genetic material exchanged increases, and its frequency. To account for clusters in cases of low genetic exchange, whether by lateral transfer or sexual recombination, ecological selection has to be the other fork of the disjunct. “Microbial” species form a continuum of gene exchange from 0% to a possible 50% in the case of obligately sexual microbes, and as that percentage drops, the explanation for the cohesion of homogeneous quasispecies clusters increasingly requires ecological niche adaptation, in the absence of stochastic explanations. As gene exchange approaches 50% exchange, the explanation must also include some role for the coadaptation of mating types and the lack of fitness of interspecific hybrids. All species are primarily adaptive quasispecies, and sexual species secondarily, as it were.
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